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Abstract
I present a formal model of path dependence inspired by England’s his-
tory. The introduction of feudalism after the Norman Conquest – the critical
juncture – created a large elite that rebelled frequently. The king fought
these revolts with the help of collaborators he recruited from the masses. In
compensation, he made these collaborators members of the elite. This was
a cost-effective form of compensation: rents were only partly rival, and so
new elite members only partially diluted the rents received by the king. The
dilution from adding new members decreased as the elite grew in size, gener-
ating positive feedback and path dependence. This mechanism can account
for the extension of rights in England in the early stages of its journey towards
democracy.
Keywords: path dependence, critical juncture, feudalism, Norman Con-
quest, Magna Carta, democracy, elites.
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1 Introduction
Social scientists have long emphasized the importance of critical junctures and path
dependence in the process of development.1 Path dependence arguments have been
particularly common in reference to England, with a long tradition in what is re-
ferred to as Whig history: the view that England followed an ineluctable path
towards liberal democracy and development. Yet in many of these accounts the spe-
cific theoretical mechanism that generated the path dependence is left unspecified.
Furthermore, prominent historians have highlighted the possibility that this process
began in the medieval period. For example, Moore, Jr. (1966) observes that “[a]
good case can be made, I think, for the thesis that western feudalism did contain
certain institutions that distinguished it from other societies in such a way as to
favor democratic possibilities”(p.415).2 But how this process was set into motion
remains unclear.
In this article I develop a formal model that makes explicit one of the mechanisms
that generated path dependence in English political development.3 I focus on the
expansion of the elite, which involved granting rights to new individuals; these
rights included the ability to write contracts, to access the courts of law, and the
protection of property. The initial extension of these elite rights lowered the cost
of granting them to additional individuals, thus generating positive feedback and
path dependence. I argue that in England this initial extension of rights took place
when the adoption of feudalism led to the creation of a large baronial class in the
1. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have recently argued that small institutional
differences at the time of the Black Death conditioned countries in western Europe, including
England, to develop differently from their Eastern European neighbors (pp.96-101).
2. Downing (1989) similarly argues that Europe’s predisposition to constitutional government
lies far back in history, to before the commercialization of agriculture and modernization. A
number of recent empirical studies – including Blaydes and Chaney (2013), Voigtla¨nder and Voth
(2013a, 2013b), Acharya and Lee (2016) and Angelucci, Meraglia, and Voigtla¨nder (2017) – has
emphasized the importance of events in the medieval period for later development.
3. For seminal work on path dependence see Pierson (2000, 2004), Ertman (1997) and Page
(2006).
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aftermath of the Norman Conquest. The feedback mechanism described in the model
then pushed the country along the early path towards democracy.4
The feedback mechanism’s starting point is the baronial revolts frequently faced
by the king.5 In order to fight the barons the king often needed the help of collabo-
rators drawn from the masses, and these had to be compensated. In some instances
making them members of the elite was a more cost-effective way of achieving col-
laboration than monetary payments or coercion.6 This is because elite rights were
essentially club goods, generating rents that were excludable but only partly rival.7
These rights were an appealing form of compensation because their excludability
made them available to elite members only, ensuring that the benefits from joining
the elite were great for individuals drawn from the masses. In addition, when rents
were largely non-rival, adding new members to the elite only partially diluted the
rents received by existing members (including the king). This resulted in a wedge
between the high value that new members derived from these rights and the low
cost imposed on existing members. When this wedge was large, granting rights was
cheaper than monetary payments or coercion.
The dilution of rights that follows from an expansion of the elite depends crucially
on the elite’s size (i.e. the number of barons). When the elite is small, the dilution
of benefits to existing members is substantial, and in this case the king pays his
collaborators a wage. But when the elite is large, dilution is limited and the king
4. My analysis ends with Magna Carta, but a similar process continued during the reigns of
Henry III and Edward I, resulting in the creation of the early English Parliament. Eventually
the baronial revolts ended, but other conflicts (e.g. with other European nations over trade and
territory) would have continued to provide the incentives for social groups to collaborate.
5. These revolts were typically motivated by both greed and self-preservation: the barons stood
to gain from overthrowing the king, and by fighting him they could try to avoid taxation and other
demands the crown might impose on them. This is discussed in more detail in the case study.
6. This was a key feature of feudalism: rights and rents were granted in exchange for military
service.
7. Club goods are excludable but nonrivalrous (or only partly rivalrous). The degree of rivalry
can vary; for example, rents derived primarily from natural resources and taxes are very rival,
while those derived from the protection and enforcement of property rights, the ability to write
contracts, and access to courts of law are largely non-rival.
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compensates them with elite rights.8 This implies that the path followed by a
society is determined by the size of its elite. If it is small, the society will follow a
contracting path in which the elite shrinks over time as the king takes advantage
of periods of peace to remove barons from it. If its elite is large, the society will
follow an expanding path in which the elite tends to become larger over time as
collaborators are incorporated into it. As the elite expands, the cost of future
extensions is reduced, and so they become more frequent. This mechanism generates
positive feedback and path dependence, with the specific path followed by a society
being determined by the size of its elite at a critical juncture early in its history.9
Furthermore, a society can switch from a contracting to an expanding path if it
experiences a large exogenous increase in the size of its elite.10
My account of historical events is as follows: the need to fight baronial and pop-
ular revolts in England, combined with the necessity to be abroad in his continental
domains for a large fraction of the time, led William the Conqueror to create a
large elite in England in the aftermath of the Norman Conquest in 1066. Evidence
collected by historians suggests that the elite grew in size from 4 to about 200 indi-
viduals.11 This was the critical juncture: prior to this point, through the reigns of
Cnut and Edward the Confessor, the elite had been contracting. Following the Con-
quest and the expansion of the elite, the country entered the expanding path, and
the elite continued to expand during the reigns of some of the period’s most impor-
tant kings: Henry I, Henry II and John. In addition to this pre- and post-Conquest
England comparison, I examine the evidence that is available for Normandy in the
8. The model does not assume commitment, but I show that under reasonable assumptions the
king will never renege.
9. In the context of this model the size of the elite proxies for the degree of democracy, and a
country has become fully democratic when a majority of its population has been given elite rights
(at which point the term elite is no longer appropriate).
10. As I discuss in the comparative statics in the appendix, it is also possible for a society to
switch paths if rents or wages change.
11. See the case study for a discussion of the sources.
4
years leading up to and after the Norman Conquest.12 The elite did not expand in
Normandy, where power remained centralized in the hands of the duke and leading
barons until the duchy was annexed by France. Finally, I discuss three alternative
explanations, based on the frameworks in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), Lizzeri
and Persico (2004) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), and argue that my
model provides a better account of developments in medieval England.
This article presents a dynamic model of transitions based on a novel mechanism
that emphasizes collaboration between social groups. In contrast to much of the
existing literature, which has focused on conflict between or within groups, my
framework has three social groups – the king, the barons and the peasants – and
captures both conflict and cooperation between them. This is consistent with the
focus in Moore, Jr. (1966) on the balance of power between the crown and barons and
their relationship to the peasants. The mechanism also emphasizes the importance
of mobility and social structure – here captured by changes in the size of the elite –
in generating path dependence and pushing the development process forward.
My focus on the period following the Norman Conquest is motivated by the
view that this was the crucial point at which England began to diverge – in terms
of government institutions and individual rights – from the rest of the world. This
article provides a rationale for seeing the Conquest and the adoption of feudalism
as the critical juncture, and shows how the mechanism can explain the extension
of rights in England in the period leading to Magna Carta. In doing so this article
adds to our understanding of a period that many historians see as pivotal for the
country’s development.
My argument is closest to Congleton (2011)’s account of the emergence of west-
12. I follow the advice in King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and present the case study using
what is essentially a difference-in-differences framework. Unfortunately there is little systematic
data for this period, and so the model’s predictions cannot be tested using quantitative methods.
Lorenzen, Fravel, and Paine (2017) discuss the advantages of case study evidence for the validation
of formal models.
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ern parliamentary democracy. In his analysis, there are shocks that make Pareto
improving constitutional trades possible, and over time the accumulation of these
small trades can lead societies to democracy. There are a number of crucial differ-
ences: I focus on a process of rights extensions that began much earlier than the
19th and 20th century franchise extensions on which Congleton (2011) focuses, and
central to the process I describe are a feedback mechanism and path dependence
that are not features of Congleton (2011)’s analysis. Finally, I emphasize the eco-
nomic calculation in the decision to extend rights, while Congleton (2011) focuses
on changes in ideology as the primary driver behind the franchise extensions.13
My emphasis on the potential gains from collaboration is related to the focus
in Galor and Moav (2006) and Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) on the comple-
mentarity between capital and labor that resulted from the Industrial Revolution.
My mechanism differs in that rights are a form of compensation for collaboration,
and this is all part of a long path-dependent process that began with the adoption
of feudalism. Finally, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) have developed a com-
prehensive theory of development where access to elite privileges and institutions is
crucial in determining whether a society is “open access” or “limited access”. This
paper presents a model that formalizes some of these ideas, but differs in that the
extension of rights is seen as an economically motivated form of compensation and
in that it provides a mechanism that generates path dependence.
13. This article is related to the large literature on democratization, which includes Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Huber, Rueschmeyer, and Stephens (1993), Collier (1999), Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2000b), Boix (2003, 2015), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Jack and Lagunoff
(2006) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009).
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2 A model of the extension of elite rights
2.1 The setting
I consider a society made up of barons and a king, who constitute the elite, and
a large number of peasants, who constitute the masses. There are a total of N
individuals in this society, with n of them being in the elite (including the king),
with 1 ≤ n ≤ N .14 The rest of the individuals are peasants. The king receives crown
income y and rents. Each baron derives income solely from rents, while peasants
earn a wage w. All individuals are otherwise identical.
There are an infinite number of periods indexed by t, where t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. The
size of the elite at the start of period t is denoted by nt−1 (so that n0 is the size
at the start of period 1). Individuals live for one period, and they each have one
offspring. Social class is inherited: the child of a baron is a baron, the child of
a peasant is a peasant, and the king’s son inherits the throne unless the king is
removed. Individuals only derive utility from their own income.15
The outline of the period game is as follows: at the start of the period the barons
decide whether to try to organize a revolt. If the barons successfully organize and
revolt, the king fights back. He can choose to recruit collaborators from the masses
and compensate them with either wages or elite rights; collaboration is therefore
costly, but it increases the probability that the king defeats the barons. A successful
revolt removes the king, who goes back to being only a baron, and places a randomly-
chosen baron in the crown.16 After a failed revolt, the king can try to renege on his
14. I assume that N is fixed. If there is population growth so that N increases, for example, I
would need to look at the fraction of elite individuals nN , and for the elite to expand n would have
to grow faster than N .
15. This is equivalent to assuming that individuals fully discount the future. The time scope
considered in this paper, which spans generations, makes this assumption less controversial than
it might be in other settings.
16. At the time, royal families would often retain lands and some power after being removed from
the throne.
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promise to collaborators and take back their wages and rights. If there is no revolt,
the king can attack the barons to expropriate their rents and reduce the size of the
elite.
2.2 Rents
Rents are available to elite members only (i.e. they are excludable) and shared
equally between them. The king is a member of the elite and so shares the rents
with the rest of the barons. The total amount of rents is given by R, and each
individual elite member receives
n− λ(n− 1)
n
R,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] measures the extent to which rents are rival. When λ = 0 rents
are non-rival, and all elite members benefit from R in rents. When λ = 1 rents
are private, and since they are divided equally between members of the elite, each
receives 1
n
R. This conceptualizes rents as a club good; the parameter λ captures
congestion, which depends on the nature and source of the rents; e.g. whether they
are derived from natural resources (λ high) or from access to legal institutions (λ
low).
2.3 The king
The king maximizes his income, which is made up of crown income y and rents. If
the king faces a baronial revolt, he defeats it with probability ψ, which captures the
crown’s strength. He can defeat it with a higher probability if he recruits collabo-
rators from the masses to help him fight; this was an avenue commonly pursued by
medieval kings. I assume that he has the option to recruit znt−1 collaborators and
that this increases his probability of success to ψe, where ψe ∼ U(ψ, 1). The value
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of ψe captures exogenous factors, including the king’s personality and leadership
skills, that affect the fruitfulness of the collaboration. The king must compensate
the collaborators with a wage w or elite rights, with the latter causing the size of
the elite to increase from nt−1 to (1 + z)nt−1.
If the king defeats the barons he can try and renege and take back the wage or
elite rights given to collaborators. If he does (r=1), he succeeds with probability ψ,
which is the crown’s strength without collaborators, and his payoff is given by
y +
1− λ(n− 1)
n
R.
If he does not try to renege (r = 0), he receives y+n−λ(n−1)
n
R if he did not collaborate,
y+ n−λ(n−1)
n
R−wznt−1 if he collaborated and paid wages, and y+ (1+z)n−λ((1+z)n−1)(1+z)n R
if he collaborated and granted elite rights.
The king’s payoffs are the same in the other two cases: when he defeats the barons
and tries to renege (r=1) but fails, and when he is defeated by the barons.17 In both
cases the king is removed from office and one of the barons is chosen at random to be
the new king. This new king expropriates y from the old king, who returns to being
a baron and so receives n−λ(n−1)
n
R if he did not collaborate, n−λ(n−1)
n
R−wznt−1 if he
collaborated and paid wages, and (1+z)n−λ((1+z)n−1)
(1+z)n
R if he collaborated and granted
elite rights.18
If the barons do not organize a revolt, the king can attack them (s = 1), expro-
priate their rents for that period, and expel some of them from the elite so that its
new size is nt−1
1+z
. Since in the absence of a revolt the barons are not organized, I
assume that the king succeeds with probability 1.
17. When the king tries to renege, the collaborators – who have just been fighting on his behalf
against the barons – can use those same weapons and skills against the king.
18. This setup can easily be reformulated to be consistent with w being the minimum amount
that must be spent on coercion to force the peasants to collaborate.
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2.4 The barons
At the start of period t there are nt−1− 1 identical barons (excluding the king) who
each maximize their income from rents. The barons jointly decide whether to try
to organize a revolt. If they try (a = 1), they succeed in solving their collective
action problem with probability σ, in which case there is a revolt (br = 1); with
probability 1 − σ they cannot solve their collective action problem and there is no
revolt (br = 0).19 If they do not try to organize (a = 0), there is no revolt (br = 0).
If there is a revolt, the barons defeat the king with probability 1− ψ or 1− ψe,
depending on how the king responds. If the barons succeed, one of them is chosen
at random to become the new king and expropriates y from the old king; all others
remain as barons. If the revolt fails, they all remain as barons, reflecting the fact
that rebellious barons often retained part of their armies even when defeated and
so could not be fully expropriated.20 This does not mean that rebelling is costless:
it often leads the king to take actions that have an impact on payoffs. If the barons
do not revolt (br = 0), they are disorganized and face the possibility of an attack
by the king. If the king attacks them, he wins with probability 1, all barons have
their rents for that period expropriated, and z
1+z
nt−1 of them, chosen at random, are
excluded from the elite and become peasants (and so the elite now has size nt−1
1+z
).
2.5 The peasants
Peasants maximize their income and receive a reservation wage w; for example, this
could be their wages when working in a farm. A peasant’s payoff depends on whether
she collaborates. If she is not invited to collaborate or rejects an invitation to do
so, she simply earns her reservation income w. If she is invited to collaborate and
19. This captures the fact that barons were often intent on launching a rebellion, but found it
difficult to coordinate.
20. It was common at the time for rebellious barons to retain their status and most of their
holdings, even if sometimes they would lose some of their lands and face temporary exile. I discuss
some examples in the case study.
10
accepts, she is rewarded with either a wage, a share of the rents (if she is granted
elite rights), or both. She receives this unless the king reneges successfully, in which
case she receives 0.21 The amount and form of compensation is determined as part
of the equilibrium.
If given elite rights, she earns rents for that period and her offspring becomes a
member of the elite. As a result, the size of the elite can change over time (i.e. it is
a state variable).
2.6 Timeline
There are an infinite number of periods indexed by t, and each period is divided
into steps. Recall that the size of the elite at the start of period t is given by nt−1:
1. ψe is realized.
2. Barons decide whether to try to organize a rebellion, a ∈ {0, 1}. If they try
(a = 1), with probability σ they solve their collective action problem and rebel
(br = 1), and with probability 1 − σ they cannot solve their collective action
problem and there is no rebellion (br = 0). If they do not try to organize,
there is no rebellion (br = 0).
If there is a rebellion:
3. The king decides whether to collaborate with znt−1 individuals. If he decides
to collaborate, he gives znt−1 peasants a wage or elite rights, and the king
defeats the barons with probability ψe. If he does not collaborate, he defeats
the barons with probability ψ.
4. The outcome of the rebellion is realized. If the king is defeated, he goes back
to being only a baron and one of the other barons is chosen at random to
21. Consequently, if the king attempts to renege and take back the wages or rights, the collabo-
rators always fight back.
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become the new king. If the king wins and there was collaboration, he decides
whether to try to renege and take back the wages he paid or the rights he
granted, and the outcome of this attempt is realized.
5. The king, barons and peasants consume their income. If the king granted elite
status and did not renege, or tried to renege and failed, the elite size increases
from nt−1 to (1 + z)nt−1.
If there is no rebellion:
3. The king decides whether to attack the barons to expropriate their rents and
shrink the elite, s ∈ {0, 1}. If he does, the king succeeds and takes all rents
for that period and reduces the size of the elite to nt−1
1+z
.
4. The king, barons and peasants consume their income.
3 The period game
This section proceeds as follows: (i) I consider the king’s decision to renege and take
back compensation from collaborators following his victory over the barons. I also
consider the king’s decision to attack the barons if the barons do not revolt. (ii) I
then derive the wages and elite rights the king must give potential collaborators in
order for them to accept (keeping in mind that the king might later renege). Given
these costs, I can (iii) solve for whether the king collaborates, and if so, how he
compensates the collaborators. And knowing that, I can then (iv) solve for whether
the barons revolt.
An equilibrium for the period t game needs to specify whether the barons at-
tempt to solve their collective action problem, whether they rebel, whether the king
attempts to collaborate and the compensation he offers, whether the peasants agree,
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whether the king reneges (if he defeats the baronial rebellion) and whether he at-
tacks the barons (if there is no baronial revolt). This will be a function of ψe, the
rents R, the rivalry of rents λ, crown income y, crown strength ψ, the number of
collaborators z, the probability that barons solve their collective action problem σ,
the reservation wage w, and the size of the elite nt−1 at the start of the period. All
proofs are in the appendix.
3.1 The king’s decision to renege
The following lemma establishes when the king will try to renege and take back the
compensation paid to collaborators:
Lemma 1 Suppose that a revolt has taken place and the king has won. If he paid
his collaborators a wage of w, he will try to renege if nt−1 >
(1−ψ)y
ψzw
. If he granted
his collaborators elite rights, he will try to renege if nt−1 < z1+z
ψλR
(1−ψ)y .
The king reneges on wages when they are costly, which is when the elite is large
because in that case he requires a large number of collaborators. The king reneges
on elite rights when they are expensive, which is when the elite is small: in that
case the dilution that follows from extending the elite is large.
If there has been no revolt, the king can attack the barons to expropriate their
rents and expel a fraction of them from the elite:
Lemma 2 If the barons do not revolt, the king always attacks them and succeeds.
This result follows directly from the assumptions, but is consistent with the historical
record: throughout the medieval period the crown constantly sought to reduce the
power of the barons and expropriate their income.
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3.2 Compensating the collaborators
I now turn to the amount of compensation the king needs to give the peasants
in order to induce them to collaborate. This amount must take into account the
possibility that, if successful against the barons, the king may try to renege and take
back the compensation. Furthermore, note that compensation is costly and so the
king never collaborates if there is no baronial revolt.
The following will prove useful:
Assumption 1 w < ψ(1− ψ)R
N
.
This assumption states that the reservation wage is smaller than the minimum
expected rents that a collaborator can expect to receive if the king has granted elite
rights to her: even if all N individuals in society have elite rights and rents are rival
(λ = 1), the expected value of the rents she receives is greater than her reservation
income. This expected value is given by R divided by the total population N ,
which is obtained with lowest probability when the king defeats the barons and
tries to renege, which happens with probability ψ(1− ψ). This assumption ensures
that collaboration is always possible if the king is willing to grant elite rights as
compensation, and that there is no need to pay a wage on top of granting these
rights:
Lemma 3 (i) Each collaborator is paid a wage or granted elite rights, but not both.
(ii) All collaborators are paid in the same way: either they all get wages or they all
get elite rights.
The next step is to determine the wage the king needs to pay to get the collab-
orators to accept, which will be affected by the possibility that he might renege:
Lemma 4 If the king pays wages, (i) he pays w = w and does not renege (r = 0)
if nt−1 ≤ 1−ψψ yzw , and (ii) pays w = w1−ψ and reneges (r = 1) if nt−1 > 1−ψψ yzw .
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If the elite is small, the king will not try to renege; this is because the risk of
losing the crown income is too high relative to the savings from taking back the
wages. In this case the king can offer the peasants their reservation wage. But if the
elite is relatively large, the king will have to hire more collaborators, and the wage
bill increases linearly with their number. In this case the king will want to renege
since the possible savings are large relative to the potential loss of crown income;
as a result, the king will have to pay higher wages in order to get the peasants to
collaborate.
Finally, assumption 1 ensures that even though the king might try to renege on
the elite rights he has granted, their expected value is still high enough to ensure
collaboration.
3.3 The king’s collaboration decision
I now establish how the king responds to a baronial revolt:
Lemma 5 Suppose that the barons have revolted (br = 1). (i) If compensation is
in wages, the king collaborates, offers wages w = w to collaborators and does not
renege (r = 0) if ψe > ψ + znt−1w
y
; the king does not collaborate if ψe ≤ ψ + znt−1w
y
.
(ii) If compensation is in elite rights, the king collaborates, offers elite rights and
does not renege (r = 0) if ψe > ψ + z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
; the king does not collaborate if
ψe ≤ ψ + z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
.
This lemma establishes whether collaboration happens in response to a baronial
revolt, conditional on the form of compensation. It also addresses the question of
whether the king reneges. It turns out that in equilibrium the king never reneges,
and the intuition is straightforward: a king will only collaborate and pay in wages if
winning is valuable and paying wages is relatively cheap (i.e. the elite is small). But
in these circumstances the king will not find it worthwhile to renege: he might lose
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the valuable crown income in an attempt to avoid a small wage bill. Likewise, the
king collaborates and gives away elite rights when the gain from doing so is large
and rights are cheap to give away (i.e. the elite is large). But in these circumstances
the king will not want to renege; he would put the crown income at risk in order to
save a small amount of rents. Although the model does not assume commitment, in
equilibrium the compensation offers are honored.
I introduce an additional assumption:
Assumption 2 y > z
1−ψ
√
λRw
1+z
.
This assumption ensures that for each elite size there will always be values of ψe for
which collaboration is optimal. It does this by requiring that crown income y be
large enough. Since the cost of defeat is in losing the crown income, if y is large the
king will be willing to collaborate for large values of ψe, even if the cost of doing
so is high. This assumption ensures that in equilibrium values of ψe close to 1 will
always lead to collaboration (regardless of how the peasants are compensated).
I now consider the optimal choices made by the king when faced by a baronial
revolt; the results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the barons have revolted (br = 1). (i) The king does
not collaborate (NC) and succeeds with probability ψ if
ψe ≤ min
{
ψ +
znt−1w
y
, ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
}
. (1)
(ii) The king collaborates, pays a wage of w, wins with probability ψe and does not
renege (CW) if
ψe > ψ +
znt−1w
y
and nt−1 <
√
λR
(1 + z)w
≡ n̂. (2)
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FIGURE 1: King’s actions in response to a baronial revolt (Proposition 1)
(iii) The king collaborates, pays by granting elite rights, wins with probability ψe and
does not renege (CE) if
ψe > ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
and nt−1 ≥
√
λR
(1 + z)w
≡ n̂. (3)
Figure 1 shows the king’s equilibrium actions in response to a baronial revolt. To
understand what these results imply, first consider the condition for no collaboration.
This says that the shock must be large enough to make it worthwhile to collaborate
and pay in either wages or by extending rights. When the shock is large, if the elite
is small (of size less than n̂), it is advantageous to pay in wages. When the elite is
large (of size greater than or equal to n̂), collaborators will be compensated with
elite rights.
It is worth noting again that elite rights are generally not a costless form of
compensation: the new elite members increase the total size of the elite, which
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reduces the rents received by each individual, including the king.22 The extent to
which this happens depends on the degree of rivalry λ. Since the king does not
internalize the full cost of elite rights extensions, there is a wedge between the cost
to the king and the benefits received by the collaborators. Since the value to the
collaborators is greater than the value to the king, granting elite rights can be a
cost-effective form of compensation.
3.4 The barons’ decision
Knowing how the king will respond, the barons must decide whether to try to
organize a revolt. The following proposition incorporates this decision and presents
the equilibria of the period game:
Proposition 2 (Equilibria) (i) Barons always choose a = 1. (ii) With probability
σ they succeed in solving their collective action problem and rebel (br = 1). The king
responds as outlined in proposition 1. (iii) With probability 1− σ the barons fail to
solve their collective action problem and cannot rebel (br = 0). The king attacks the
barons (s = 1) and succeeds, expropriates all of the rents for that period, and znt−1
1+z
randomly-chosen barons are expelled from the elite.
This proposition shows that conflict will be a constant feature of this society:
the king will always seek to weaken the barons, and knowing this, the barons will
always preemptively try to attack the king. Furthermore, they also stand to gain if
they succeed, as one of them is chosen as the new king and expropriates y from the
old king.23 When the barons succeed in organizing a rebellion, the king must decide
whether to bring in collaborators from the masses and how to compensate them. If
he gives them rights the elite expands, and this decreases the cost of granting rights
22. The exception is when rents are entirely non-rival (λ = 0).
23. This is consistent with the experience of England during the Middle Ages, where predatory
kings often sought to expropriate the barons, who in turn had to organize and rebel defensively. I
discuss this later in the context of King John and Magna Carta.
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to additional individuals in the future. If the barons fail to revolt, the king attacks
them, takes their rents, and reduces the size of the elite.
4 The feedback process and path dependence
I now consider how the size of the elite evolves over time, and so examine the long-
term implications of the mechanism just described. This requires the introduction
of some additional notation. As before, I will denote the size of the elite at the
start of period t as nt−1, which takes a value in the set E = {e0, e1, ..., eD}, with
an element of this set denoted by ei. If the elite size at time t is nt = ei and
there are no extensions or contractions, the following period we have nt+1 = ei; if
there is an extension we have nt+1 = ei+1, and if there is a contraction nt+1 = ei−1.
Furthermore, ei+1 = (1 + z)ei for i = 0, ..., D − 1, and so every ei can be written as
a function of e0: ej = (1 + z)
je0.
To construct the set of all possible states, assume that the size of the elite at
the start of the process is e˜. How much the elite can contract is bounded by 1 (the
smallest elite size), while how much it can expand is limited by the size of the overall
population N . The smallest elite size e0 corresponds to the elite size that satisfies
three conditions: (i) e0 ≥ 1, (ii) e01+z < 1 and (iii) e˜ = e0(1 + z)s for some s. To
determine the value of D, I assume that all states N
1+z
< ei ≤ N are absorbing, and
it follows that for each e0 there will be a unique D such that
N
1+z
< eD ≤ N , where
eD = (1 + z)
De0.
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Suppose that we start observing this process at the start of period t, and that
the elite size at that point is e˜. We need to consider two cases.
24. To find this value of D suppose that d′ is the minimum number of transitions necessary for
the state to reach the absorbing region; that is, d′ satisfies both (i) (1 + z)d
′−1e0 < N1+z and (ii)
(1 + z)d
′
e0 >
N
1+z , which after solving for d
′ gives ln(N)−ln(e0)ln(1+z) − 1 < d′ < ln(N)−ln(e0)ln(1+z) . I then define
D(e0) ≡
⌊
ln(N)−ln(e0)
ln(1+z)
⌋
, where b.c denotes the floor operator. For simplicity, I do not make the
dependence of D on e0 explicit.
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4.1 Case 1: nt−1 = e˜ < n̂
There is a baronial revolt with probability σ, in which case the king collaborates and
pays in wages (CW) if condition (ii) from proposition 1 is satisfied; otherwise the
king does not collaborate (NC). In either case the elite size remains unchanged. With
probability 1 − σ the barons fail to rebel and the king attacks them, expropriates
their rents, and the elite size is reduced from e˜ to e˜
1+z
.
4.2 Case 2: nt−1 = e˜ ≥ n̂
There is a baronial revolt with probability σ, in which case the king collaborates and
grants elite rights (CE) if condition (iii) from proposition 1 is satisfied; otherwise the
king does not collaborate (NC). Given the distribution of ψe, there is collaboration
and elite rights are extended with probability
Pr
(
ψe ≥ ψ + z
1 + z
λR
e˜y
)
= 1− z
1 + z
λR
(1− ψ)e˜y ≡ p(e˜),
which is increasing in e˜. Assumption 2 and the fact that in this case e˜ ≥ n̂ ensure
that p(e˜) is bounded between 0 and 1. In this case the elite increases from e˜ to
(1 + z)e˜ as a result of the extension of rights. With probability 1 − σ the barons
fail to rebel and the king attacks them, expropriates their rents, and the elite size
is reduced to e˜
1+z
.
I can now lay out the dynamic structure implied by the model. This setup
generates a Markov chain, with states {e0, e1, ..., eD} where ei+1 = (1 + z)ei for
i = 0, ..., D − 1, and the transition probabilities between states are given by:
Pr(ei | ei) Pr(ei+1 | ei) Pr(ei−1 | ei) Pr(ei+j | ei, j ≥ 2) Pr(ei | ei+j, j ≥ 2)
case 1 σ 0 1− σ 0 0
case 2 σ[1− p(ei)] σp(ei) 1− σ 0 0
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𝑒0 𝑒1 = (1 + 𝑧)𝑒0 𝑒𝐷−1 = (1 + 𝑧)
𝐷−1𝑒0 𝑒𝐷 = (1 + 𝑧)
𝐷 𝑒0
1 − σ
σ𝑝(𝑒𝐷−1)
1 − σ
…
σ𝑝(𝑒𝐷−2)
1 − σ 1 − σ
σ[1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝐷−1)]
ො𝑛
Case 1 Case 2
σ
1
σ
FIGURE 2: Markov chain where states correspond to elite sizes. To the left of n̂
case 1 applies, while to the right of n̂ case 2 applies.
for all e0 < ei < eD. For the corner case with elite size e0, I assume that the state is
absorbing, Pr(e0 | e0) = 1. For the case with elite size eD, I assume that p(eD) = 0,
and so Pr(eD | eD) = σ and Pr(eD−1 | eD) = 1− σ. This Markov chain is shown in
figure 2.
The main result is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 p(ei+1) > p(ei) for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., D − 2} such that ei ≥ n̂,
and so in this range of elite sizes the probability of transitioning to a larger elite
is increasing in the size of the elite. The one exception is at the end of the chain,
where p(eD) = 0.
There are two paths that a society can follow: a contracting path in which the elite
shrinks over time, and an expanding path in which it can grow over time. The key
determinant of the path followed by a society is the size of its elite: if n < n̂, it
is in the contracting path; if n ≥ n̂, it is in the expanding path. The proposition
establishes that in the expanding path the speed of growth increases with elite size:
the first few extensions have a small probability associated with them, but as the
elite becomes larger the probability of further extensions increases. This positive
feedback process – from elite size to extensions, back to elite size – is what generates
the path dependence. The probability that the barons solve their collective action
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problem (σ) plays a central role in the expanding path: if 1− σ < σp(e˜) expansions
will be on average more frequent than contractions, and over time the society’s
elite will become larger; if the opposite holds, over time the elite will shrink and
eventually switch into the contracting path.25
The size of the elite is the key state variable and the one that generates the
feedback that gives rise to path dependence. It follows from this discussion that
a society may switch between the contracting and expanding paths as a result of
exogenous shocks to the size of its elite. If an expanding elite suddenly collapses, it
might enter the contracting path and start shrinking.26 Likewise, if a contracting
elite experiences a sudden increase in its size, it may enter the expanding path. I
argue that the latter is precisely what happened in England in the aftermath of
the Norman Conquest: the size of the elite increased considerably and as a result
England switched from a contracting to an expanding path.27
5 Historical evidence
5.1 Elite rights in medieval England
To illustrate the mechanism just described, I examine how English kings responded
to baronial revolts in the period surrounding the Norman Conquest in 1066. I focus
on the most important kings of the period: Cnut, Edward the Confessor, William
25. If 1−σ = σp(e˜), in expectation the elite size will remain constant, although the realized elite
size will vary from period to period.
26. This could happen, for example, as the result of a revolt that leads to the death of many
barons, with the sudden drop in elite size causing the path to switch.
27. Societies can switch between paths for other reasons; in particular, the thresholds identified
in proposition 1 can shift as the parameters of the model change, and in doing so might cause
a shift in the path followed by a society. Furthermore, differences in these parameters can help
explain differences across societies: even if two societies have elites of the same size, they may
follow different paths if their parameters – and consequently their thresholds – are different. These
comparative statics results are discussed in the appendix.
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the Conqueror, Henry I, Henry II, and John.28 I show that before the Conquest
the size of the elite was small and shrinking in both England and Normandy and
that there was a large increase in the size of the English elite in the post-Conquest
years: from 4 to about 200 individuals. This transformed the way in which kings
responded to baronial revolts: they began to grant elite rights to collaborators. I
then show that there is no evidence of such a change in Normandy following the
Conquest.29
This setup is analogous to a difference-in-differences study that uses two admin-
istrative units to examine the impact of an exogenous policy change that affects
one of the units (the treated) but not the other (the control).30 If we assume that
the control is a valid counterfactual for the treated, we can estimate the impact
of the policy change by comparing the response of the treated unit to that of the
control. In my setting the two administrative units are England and Normandy,
and the Conquest increased the size of the elite in the former but not in the latter.
Therefore I can estimate the impact of that initial increase in the English elite by
comparing how the post-Conquest elites in both societies evolved over time.
The underlying assumption is that Normandy is a valid counterfactual for Eng-
land: that in the absence of the Norman Conquest, the trend followed by the English
elite would have been the same as the one followed by the elite in Normandy (see
figure 3). I show that prior to the Conquest the elites in both societies were shrink-
ing. Furthermore, the Conquest led to the introduction of Norman institutions into
28. I do not examine the reigns of Harold Harefoot (1035-1040), Harthacnut (1040-1042), Harold
Godwinson (1066), William Rufus (1087-1100), Stephen (1135-1154) or Richard (1189-1199). This
is partly for brevity, partly because less information is available for these kings, and partly because
some of them ruled during extraordinary circumstances or spent most of their reigns abroad (e.g.
Stephen ruled during the Anarchy, Richard was away in the Crusades and later imprisoned near
Vienna).
29. For much of the post-Conquest period the king of England ruled over Normandy (until it was
annexed by France in 1204), yet did not respond to baronial threats there in the same way he did
in England.
30. I follow the King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) advice to structure the case study in a way
that parallels a quantitative (econometric) analysis.
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size
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Conquest
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FIGURE 3: Elite trends before and after the Norman Conquest
England, and so we would have expected the elites in both societies to evolve in the
same way in the post-Conquest period. However they did not, and this must then
be due to the modifications made to Norman institutions in the process of adapting
them to the English context. I argue that the key change was the creation of a large
elite in England, something that was necessary because of the high risk of revolt
by the local English population (who had just been invaded), the fact that England
was to most Normans an unknown territory, and because William had to spend time
away in his continental domains.
There are a number of points worth noting. First, it is not necessary to show that
both elites had the same size prior to the Conquest, but only that their numbers
were moving in the same direction (in this case downwards). Second, Normandy
became a colonizing power in 1066; this was not random and it may have affected
the size of its elite. However, I find no evidence of the elite – or the process whereby
it was extended or shrunk – having changed in Normandy in the aftermath of the
Conquest, even if some of the Norman barons acquired lands in England.
Finally, there are two potential sources of bias. First, much less information is
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available for Normandy than for England, partly because Normandy was annexed by
France in 1204 and most local records did not survive.31 This differential availability
of data should not introduce any bias unless it is correlated with the size of the elite,
which seems unlikely. Second, there would be selection bias if the monarchs I focus
on ruled for long periods of time thanks to their strategy of extending rights, while
the ones who ruled for shorter periods did not employ that strategy. This however
seems unlikely (for example, William Rufus died in a hunting accident).
5.1.1 Cnut (1016-1035)
Cnut was the “first ruler of a really united England” (Brooke 1961, p.61) and came
to power following the civil war that broke out towards the end of King Ethelred’s
reign. The main challenge he faced as king was to consolidate his control over
England.
Evidence from royal charters, which were typically signed by the earls, shows that
there were eleven earls in the first 10 years of Cnut’s reign. Seven had Scandinavian
names, which is unsurprising given that Cnut was Danish (Larson 1910). There is
little evidence from the five years that followed, as no charters survive from that
period. In those years the king was fully occupied by war and pilgrimage to Rome,
and it is likely that he was often absent and made few grants (Larson 1910). When
records resume, the old earls have largely disappeared, and evidence points towards
the existence of only four earls, corresponding to three of the families (Godwine,
Leofric and Siward) that will continue to play a key role up to the Norman Conquest
(Larson 1910; Barlow 1999, pp.44-45).
This suggests that Cnut removed some of his earls in the period for which records
are absent. This is consistent with the framework I have presented: in the absence
31. Haskins (1909) notes that “[o]ur main reliance must be upon the charters, and even here, such
has been the destruction of Norman records, the body of materials is less than for contemporary
England”.
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of a revolt, Cnut would have taken the opportunity to remove some members of
his elite. The fact that after he became king Cnut collected Danegold, paid off his
troops and sent them back to Denmark (Brooke 1961, pp.62-63), combined with the
fact that the earls who disappeared were those of Scandinavian origin, suggests that
Cnut was removing elite members who were no longer necessary to support his rule
over England.32
5.1.2 Edward the Confessor (1042-1066)
Edward the Confessor became king seven years after the death of Cnut, and the
period between their reigns saw two kings and nearly continuous fighting. Following
the pacification of the country, the main challenge Edward faced was the revolt by
Godwine, the wealthiest and most powerful earl in the country (Barlow 1999, pp.48-
53). Edward mobilized for war, and with help from the Normans and the Northern
earls, he defeated the rebellion and forced Godwine to compromise (pp.50-51).
Edward the Confessor’s behavior is consistent with a CW strategy: gaining
collaborators without having to expand the elite. This can account for why the
families that dominated politics in the eve of the Norman Conquest were the same
that had done so towards the end of Cnut’s reign. These four families remained
powerful, since Edward did not respond to Godwine’s revolt by expanding the elite.33
5.1.3 William the Conqueror (1066-1087)
Following the death of Edward the Confessor and the coronation of Harold Godwin-
son in 1066, William of Normandy launched an invasion force to conquer England
32. The evolution of the popular assembly – the volkmoot – into the ‘council of wise men’ – the
witanagemot – is consistent with this interpretation of rights being withdrawn. By the time of
Cnut’s reign it is likely that the volkmoot had already evolved into the witanagemot in a process
that Taylor (1889) describes as having taken place very slowly.
33. At the time the witanagemot did not meet regularly, and its decisions were rarely unanimous.
Its last act was to choose Harold – one of Godwine’s sons – as heir to Edward and thus precipitate
the succession conflict that would culminate in the Norman Conquest (Barrow 1956, p. 29).
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and claim the throne. The Norman invasion was the last time that England experi-
enced a complete change in its ruling class, and thus represents a clear break in the
country’s political development. This, I argue, was the critical juncture.
William introduced feudalism and rewarded the men who came with him to
England with land and rights. Most of these soldiers were mercenaries (Barlow 1999,
p.91), “fellow speculators in the gamble, out for wages, booty, and land . . . William’s
army was, in short, an army of mercenaries and adventurers”, with many of them
“counting on generous grants of territory” (Hollister 1965, pp.17-18). But feudalism
was also introduced as a way to ensure that the crown could raise an army at
short notice at a time when it was unusual to keep a large fighting force constantly
mobilized (Barrow 1956, pp.45-46). The main goal was to protect the new order
against internal revolt by former English nobles and thegns (a class in Anglo-Saxon
society similar to that of the knights) and to fight off any foreign invasions (Barlow
1999, p.93). As Howard (1976) observes, “militarily speaking the Norman dynasty
in England and their successors were hopelessly overstretched; not only keeping the
native English in order and extending their frontiers into Scotland and Wales, but
maintaining their own rights in the mainland of Europe” (p.10).
The resulting social structure involved 200 substantial tenants-in-chief: earls and
barons holding land directly from the crown (Dyer 2002, p.85). Brooke (1961) puts
the number of barons at around 180 (p.97), while Barrow (1956) speaks of “the two
hundred or so barons who were the natural leaders of this small but dominant class”
(p.84).34 In short, the Norman Conquest transformed a small elite of 4 earls into a
large elite of about 200 barons.35
34. The consistency across authors is likely a result of all of them using the Domesday book as
their source.
35. This large extension of the elite is consistent with the comparative statics discussed in the
appendix: following the Norman invasion, the value and rivalry of rents (λR) would have been
small, since the conquered territory had plenty of land and resources to give away. Likewise, the
cost of employing mercenaries for a long period of time in a hostile land would have been very
high, equivalent to a high w.
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5.1.4 Henry I (1100-1135)
Henry I assumed the throne in 1100 following the accidental death of his brother,
King William Rufus. He immediately faced the prospect of a baronial rebellion
aimed at putting his older brother, Duke Robert of Normandy, in the English throne
(Barrow 1956, p.72). During his coronation, Henry issued a Charter of Liberties that
granted the English barons a number of rights aimed at protecting them from some
of the most serious abuses they had suffered under William Rufus (p.72). The threat
posed by Robert and his allies meant that Henry had to earn the loyalty of both
the English barons and the rest of the population, and this extension of rights can
be interpreted as Henry following strategy CE.
As part of his strategy to stay in power, Henry sought to develop a more effective
royal government by introducing methods that helped bring the crown into check
(p.71). A central part of this process was the development of a legal system that
gave the barons jurisdiction over the hundred courts, which provided them with
income and increased their power and prestige (p.79-80).
Some of these were “new men”, that is “men whom the king had ‘raised from
the dust’, and promoted over the heads of the hereditary nobles. . . laymen, raised
to baron’s rank and requiring fiefs to support them” (p.75). This helped make the
government more efficient, and crucially these men, who had been trained in combat,
were loyal to Henry: “[t]he feudal aristocracy was certainly no caste. Henry himself
was accused by Orderic of promoting men from the dust. But in practice his new
barons were not yeomen or peasants; they had all, by definition, to be trained to
knightly pursuits, to be brought up in the traditions of the feudal classes. Henry
undoubtedly added to the number of the barons . . . It no doubt gave Henry strength
in his own and other men’s eyes that not all the great men of his court owed their
place to his father or brother” (Brooke 1961, pp.163-164). This allowed Henry to
remodel the elite into a group of barons loyal to him, in what has been described as
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a “reconstructed baronage” (Hollister 2003, p.329).36
Many of these individuals joined the ranks of the elite: “[g]reatest among Henry’s
lay officials were Aubrey de Vere and Richard Basset . . . [i]n the next reign Aubrey’s
son acquired an earldom, and the Veres were earls of Oxford until 1604” (Brooke
1961, p164). That is, many of these men ended up founding their own dynasties
(Barrow 1956, p.75).
5.1.5 Henry II (1154-1189)
Henry II came to the throne at the end of the Anarchy and his first challenge was to
rebuild England and to protect and expand his territories in France (Brooke 1961,
p.175).37 But it was the rebellion of 1173 that represented the biggest crisis of his
reign (Carpenter 2004, p.223): three of his sons, his wife, the king of France and a
fraction of the barons joined forces to try to remove him from the throne.
Henry defeated this revolt with the help of “new men” who had been chosen on
the basis of their loyalty and military talent. Like his grandfather Henry I, Henry II
promoted minor nobles to positions of authority in England (Peltzer 2004), although
he “followed the advice of his mother, the old Empress, and trained such men as he
would hawks, keeping them eager by keeping them hungry” (Carpenter 2004, p.200).
Furthermore, Henry II then sought to address the weaknesses that he believed had
contributed to the revolt by issuing the Assize of Northampton, which gave the
authorities increased powers to deal with criminality and helped solidify the rights
of tenants.38 He made legal reforms that expanded the jurisdiction of the royal
court, resulting in better legal protection for non-elites (Dyer 2002, p.102). These
changes, which included the legal reforms that are often considered to form the basis
36. Henry raised revenue through scutage, a payment that barons could make in lieu of knight-
service. This can be interpreted as a way of extracting some of the rents enjoyed by the barons.
37. Henry II inherited an empire that combined the territories held by his maternal grandfather
Henry I and those of his paternal side, which included Anjou, Touraine, and Maine.
38. The Assize of Northampton was based on the earlier Assize of Clarendon (1166), a set of
instructions given to itinerant judges aimed at tightening up criminal justice (Barrow 1956, p.156).
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of English Common Law, are consistent with the CE strategy.
5.1.6 John (1199-1216)
King John assumed the throne following the death of his brother King Richard the
Lionheart, and the most significant development in his reign was the issue of Magna
Carta in 1215. The seeds of the conflict that led to Magna Carta date back to at
least 1204, when John lost Normandy and most of his other continental domains to
the French king Philip Augustus (Barrow 1956, p.189). King John became obsessed
with recovering his lost territories, and his attempts to raise an army relied on heavy
taxation – many of it in new forms that created great resentment in the baronage
and population.39 The barons had little interest in John’s attempts to recover
Normandy, as a large fraction of them no longer held lands in the continent (Barlow
1999, p.330; Brooke 1961, pp.217-218). When his French expedition collapsed in
1214 the English barons rebelled (Barrow 1956, p.205).40 John was weak and at this
point could no longer afford to fight; for example, raising income to hire mercenaries
would have been prohibitively expensive for a king who was chronically short of
income.41 Through the mediation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, a truce was
reached and Magna Carta was issued.
Magna Carta can be interpreted as a strategic move by John to gain time and
potential allies for a future struggle; that is, John’s strategy was consistent with
CE. This view is backed by the belief, held by some historians, that John did not
intend to honor the concessions the charter made to the barons.42 Additionally, John
39. John also relied heavily on scutage: “Henry II and Richard I had taken eleven scutages in
forty-five years. John took eleven scutages in sixteen years” (Barrow 1956, p.197).
40. Part of the motivation appears to have been to keep John from becoming too strong (Barlow
1999, p.331).
41. Consistent with the comparative statics in the appendix, John faced high w and had low y,
both favoring a CE strategy. Income from the royal demesne (i.e. royal lands) was limited since
previous kings had alienated a considerable fraction of it; by 1200 only about a third of the land
held by William the Conqueror in 1086 was still in the hands of the crown (p.329).
42. For example, Barrow (1956) states that conflict arose as a result of the “utter disbelief of the
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exhibited great cunning in the negotiations; for example, “[t]he Charter included an
elaborate clause providing machinery for its enforcement by a committee of twenty-
five barons, to be called into existence if the king broke the Charter” (Brooke 1961,
p.223), but John issued the charter before this provision, which greatly threatened
his authority, could be finalized (Carpenter 2004, p.297). This suggests that John
manipulated the charter to maximize his chances of survival. Finally, although
the charter focuses mostly on concessions to the barons, there were provisions that
benefited the population at large (Barrow 1956, p.207; Brooke 1961, pp.220-221).43
In short, the charter can be interpreted as an attempt by King John to follow
strategy CE to gain the support of important allies in expectation of his future
struggle against the barons.44
The war resumed soon after Magna Carta was issued, and although initially
John had an advantage – partly as a result of earning the support of the Welsh and
Irish marcher barons, who were the only ones able to raise a feudal army (Barlow
1999, p.354) – this changed when the French crown joined the war and dispatched a
large invasion force to England (Carpenter 2004, pp.298-299). Many of John’s allies
changed sides, and he died from dysentery soon after. The French eventually lost the
war and John’s son became king, but the rights contained in Magna Carta continued
to be at the center of a long struggle that extended through the reigns of Henry III
and Edward I, and eventually yielded greater baronial power and England’s first
parliament.
opposition that the king had any sincere intention of mending his ways, and by the king’s own
desire. . . to have the Charter annulled” (p.208).
43. Many of the concessions made to the barons had to be passed down, so that the chapters
in Magna Carta constrained the barons and provided benefits to those who were dependent on
them. For example, Magna Carta gave considerable rights to knights to rule locally (Carpenter
2004, p.291).
44. Brooke (1961) reflects this view when he claims that “[i]t is clear that the barons had to
compete with the king for support outside their own class” (p.221).
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5.2 Elite rights in Normandy
I now turn my attention to the duchy of Normandy in the period surrounding the
Conquest of England. I show that despite sharing its feudal institutions and often its
ruler with England, the Norman elite did not expand in the post-Conquest period.
In fact, the available evidence suggests that it continued to contract.45
Before the conquest
In the period leading up to the Conquest, Normandy underwent changes sim-
ilar to those taking place in England during the reigns of Cnut and Edward the
Confessor: the elite shrunk over time, with a small number of families becoming
increasingly more powerful.
William became duke of Normandy in 1035 while still a child, and during his
minority feuds between his barons became common. Many of these fights were
between powerful barons who sought to extend their domains at the expense of
smaller landowners (Bates 1982, p.101). The result was the contraction of the elite,
as “[t]here was a sense in which the expansion of estates meant the spread of the
domination of stronger families over weaker ones” (p.102). This anarchy ended
when William became an adult and restored the ducal government’s role in peace-
keeping, but the elite continued to contract and from about 1050 “the opportunity to
make territorial acquisitions was closely controlled” (p.101). In particular, “[a]fter
1050 Normandy also seems to have ceased to be a land which gave opportunity for
immigrants to make their fortunes. In consequence, the aristocracy appear to have
turned some of their energies into consolidations” (p.101).
After the conquest
The impact of the Conquest on the size and power of the elite in Normandy
45. As discussed earlier, very few Normans records from the period have survived and so unfor-
tunately there is much less information available for Normandy than there is for England.
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appears to have been limited. The inquest of 1091, known as the Consuetudines
at Iusticie, which aimed to describe the powers exercised by duke William, demon-
strated “a very strong continuity from Carolingian notions of authority” (Bates 1982,
pp.162-163). Furthermore, there appear to have been only about 40 large vassals
in Normandy during William’s rule (p.170); that is, between a fifth and a fourth of
the number in post-Conquest England. This appears to have been partly a result
of William’s attempt to reduce the number of barons: “when William II rebuilt the
prerogative control over fortifications, he did so, not by entrusting castles to social
upstarts, but by granting them to those members of the leading families whom he
felt he could rely on” (p.167). This suggests that in Normandy William did not
employ the elite expansion strategy that he used in England.
Upon his death, William the Conqueror left Normandy to his son Robert and
England to his son William Rufus, and the two territories had separate governments
until Henry I brought them back together in 1106. Henry restored law and order and
began to develop institutions similar to those that he was introducing in England.
Although Norman institutions developed during his reign, they did not do so to the
same extent as they did across the channel (Newman 1988). By the time of Henry II’s
reign, England and Normandy had already diverged considerably. Henry’s position
in Normandy had been weakened by his predecessor Geoffrey of Anjou’s strategy
of giving away ducal land to the barons (Carpenter 2004, p.191), and Henry had
to spend much time in Normandy shoring up support. He extended his domains
by claiming back land that had been alienated by his predecessors (Barrow 1956,
p.163), consistent with the shrinking of the elite and the expropriation of rents.
Twelfth-century Normandy “was a highly centralised feudal principality, over which
the duke maintained a control firmer than that exercised by any other secular ruler
in western Europe” (p.163), and it was “still more like the private fief of a great
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baron than an embryo state” (Barrow 1956, p.163-164).46
5.3 Alternative explanations for the extension of rights in
medieval England
I now consider three alternative explanations – drawn from three well-known frame-
works used to explain institutional change – and discuss why my model provides a
better account of the medieval period just discussed.
The threat of revolution
The threat of revolution argument, most closely associated with the work of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2006), is a prominent example of a
framework that focuses on the conflict between the masses and the elite. Their
theory states that rights (in their case the right to vote) are extended to sections of
the population to reduce their threat of revolution. In particular, voting rights are a
credible commitment to future redistribution, while promises of future redistribution
can be reneged upon by the elites once the revolutionary threat has passed. Recent
work has found empirical support for this mechanism in the period of the Great
Reform Act of 1832 (Aidt and Franck 2015).
This mechanism does not appear to be at work in the period considered in
this paper. In a strict interpretation of their model, the Acemoglu and Robinson
framework implies that the king would make concessions to the barons to keep them
from revolting, and that those concessions (e.g. rights) would solve the commitment
problem inherent in promising future concessions. Yet the medieval setting was
very different: revolts happened and were in fact very frequent; the extension of
rights was not a concession aimed at defusing the threat from rebellious barons, but
46. By this point Normandy was also considerably poorer: it generated a revenue of £6,750 in
1180 while England generated £23,300 for most of the 1180s (Carpenter 2004, p.200).
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instead sought to secure the collaboration of other social groups (e.g. the masses)
in the fight against those barons; and these rights were not a device to commit the
king, as he often violated or withdrew them.
My model is consistent with all of these facts. In my account the king buys
the support of individuals who can help him fight the barons and stay in power.
The extension of rights is in some sense voluntary, and it is motivated by economic
calculation rather than because it helps the king to commit (in fact, my model
does not assume commitment and the king can renege on his compensation offer).
In contrast to the Acemoglu and Robinson framework, my model allows for social
mobility in that peasants can become barons and barons can become peasants, a
process that can generate path dependence.47 Finally, my framework emphasizes
the importance of collaboration between different social groups, in this case between
the king and the masses, in the process of development.
Conflict within the elite
I focus on the version of this argument developed in Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
In their account politicians want to redistribute in a targeted way in order to gain
votes, but when public goods are valuable many members of the elite will want
them to be provided. The elite extends the franchise in order to induce politicians
to provide these goods: since there are now more voters, it becomes too costly for
politicians to gain votes by redistributing in a targeted way, and so they switch
to public goods. This mechanism is then used to account for the largely peaceful
extension of the franchise in England, where the growth of cities and their increased
demand for local public goods provided the impetus for reform.
In accordance with my account, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) emphasize conflict
47. My argument is close in spirit to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), which argues that small
institutional differences due to chance early in a country’s history can play a large role in how
societies react to events in critical junctures.
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within the elite, and argue that the positive benefits from the reforms – as opposed
to just avoiding the costs associated with not reforming – played a key role in
making them attractive. In a strict interpretation of their model, the barons would
extend rights in order to induce the king to provide public goods. But in the
medieval period rights were extended by the king, and he did so because it was
a cost-effective way for him to earn supporters. Furthermore, medieval kings had
limited state capacity and provided close no to public goods except the occasional
enforcement of social order. There were no elections and the assemblies that existed
at the time – the witanagemot or the council – had little power and their members
were typically appointed by the king. My model accounts for all of these facts, and in
addition allows for social mobility and provides a mechanism that can generate path
dependence. Finally, my framework emphasizes the importance of collaboration
between different social groups in the process of development. These important
features of my argument are not part of the Lizzeri and Persico (2004) framework.
Selectorate theory
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) show how the selectorate theory developed
in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) can explain institutional change. It presents a
framework that combines the struggle between the elites and the masses in Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2000b) with the within-elite conflict and public goods aspects
of Lizzeri and Persico (2004). The incumbent faces two threats: from the winning
coalition (those whose support is essential for the leader to survive) and the pop-
ulation at large. The leader can employ both private and public goods, but faces
a budget constraint that generates a trade-off between these two strategies. Cru-
cially, the nature of the trade-off depends on the size of the winning coalition. The
authors then examine when there might be cross-group support for an extension
or contraction of the winning coalition and argue that in these instances we could
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expect moves towards or away from democracy.
There are a number of similarities between my framework and that in Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith (2009): both look at three groups, allow for extensions and
contractions of the winning coalition (the elite) and so allow for social mobility, and
have the leader face a trade-off between different forms of compensation. However,
their framework cannot fully account for the medieval events discussed in this paper.
With the exception of the early years of William the Conqueror’s reign, the threat of
revolt by the masses was not a central concern. Instead, it was revolt by the barons
which occupied most of the king’s time. And while in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2009) the leader seeks to buy the support of members of the coalition in order to
avoid defections (and in equilibrium there are no revolts), in medieval England the
king frequently faced baronial rebellions and sought the help of individuals outside
this group (e.g. from the masses) in order to fight the barons. My framework
accounts for these facts, but in addition differs from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2009) in that it emphasizes the importance of collaboration between different social
groups, in this case between the king and the masses, and in that the extension of
elite rights changes the state variable (the size of the elite) and generates positive
feedback and path dependence.
6 Conclusion
In this article I present a mechanism that generates path dependence and argue that
the Norman Conquest was the critical juncture that set England in the path towards
political development. My framework emphasizes the importance of social structure,
mobility, and collaboration between social groups in the process of development.
There are a number of issues that my analysis has not addressed. First, to
what extent does the same mechanism apply later in English history? Preliminary
37
research I have done suggests that this mechanism was at work in later periods,
although the type of conflict motivating the collaboration was different: baronial
revolts eventually came to an end, but trade competition and large international
wars created the need for different social groups to collaborate. Second, to what
extent was a similar mechanism at work in other western European societies? And
finally, can this mechanism help explain the Great Divergence between western
Europe and east Asia? These are all important questions, but each requires its
own full-length study, and so I have deferred these questions to future work. These
omissions notwithstanding, this article contributes to our understanding of the long-
term process of political development, and I hope it will motivate future work in
this fundamental area of research.
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A.1 Comparative Statics
So far I have focused on how the size of the elite determines whether a society faces
a contracting path in which the elite size shrinks over time, or an expanding path
in which the elite can expand as a response to baronial revolts. The size of the
elite is the key state variable and the one that generates the feedback that gives
rise to path dependence, with exogenous changes in the size of the elite potentially
causing a society to switch between paths. But societies can switch between paths
for other reasons; in particular, the thresholds identified in proposition 1 can shift as
the parameters of the model change, and in doing so might cause a shift in the path
followed by a society. Furthermore, differences in these parameters can help explain
differences across societies; even if two societies have elites of the same size, they
may follow different paths if their parameters – and consequently their thresholds –
are different.
It is useful to think about the parameter space as being partitioned by two axes:
(i) the value n̂ =
√
λR
(1+z)w
partitions the elite size space into two, corresponding
graphically to the left and right of the cutoff value n̂ in the x-axis, and (ii) the
collaboration threshold on the vertical axis, which depends on which side of the
elite cutoff n̂ a society is in. If to the left (n < n̂), then the relevant cutoff is given
by ψ + znt−1w
y
; if ψe ≤ ψ + znt−1w
y
there is no collaboration, while if ψe > ψ + znt−1w
y
there is collaboration and compensation is in wages. If to the right (n ≥ n̂), then the
relevant cutoff is given by ψ+ z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
; if ψe ≤ ψ+ z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
there is no collaboration,
while if ψe > ψ+ z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
there is collaboration and compensation is in elite rights.
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𝑛𝑡
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(1 + 𝑧)𝑤
ψ
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𝑦
ψ +
𝑧
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𝜆𝑅
𝑛𝑡−1𝑦
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(d) y ↑
FIGURE 1: Parameter changes and how they affect the king’s actions. In panels (a)
and (b) the value of n̂ changes: an increase in rents or their rivalry can shift a society
from the expanding to the contracting path. An increase in the reservation wage
has the opposite effect: it can shift a society from the contracting to the expanding
path. In panels (c) and (d) an increase in the crown’s strength or income affects
the range of values of ψe for which collaboration happens, but these changes do not
affect n̂ and therefore cause no shift in a society’s path.
A.1.1 The size of rents or their rivalry
Suppose that λR increases either because of an increase in the size of rents R or
their rivalry λ; this has an impact on both the elite size threshold n̂ and the shock
threshold to the right of the elite threshold, with both shifting to the right. The
effect is captured graphically in panel (a) of figure 1. As a result, the range of elite
2
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sizes for which the decision is between NC and CW is increased. Furthermore, for
the range of elite sizes still facing the choice between NC and CE, the values of ψe for
which CE is optimal is reduced to include only large realizations of ψe. Therefore,
an increase in λR makes it more likely that societies will not expand their elites
unless their elites are already large or the shock is large. In terms of the dynamics,
the set of elite sizes for which contractions happens is larger, and the transition
probabilities for all other cases are reduced. As a result, countries with large λR
are less likely to have expanding elites, and when they do, their expansion will be
slower.
A.1.2 The size of the outside wage
An increase in the outside wage w decreases n̂, which increases the region of elite
sizes for which the extension of rights is possible. It also increases the threshold for
collaboration to the left of n̂. The effect is shown graphically in panel (b) of figure 1.
This has two implications: first, the range of elite sizes for which no extensions take
place is reduced, but the minimum value of ψe for which collaboration happens goes
up. In other words, for small elite sizes it is now less likely that collaboration will
happen, because the cost of collaborators is higher. Second, the threshold n̂ for elite
expansion is lowered, and so the elite will start expanding in some cases where before
it would not have done so. This is because in these cases it becomes cost-effective to
expand the elite instead of paying wages. For larger elite sizes nothing changes: the
line marking the threshold does not change. In term of the dynamics, states might
change from the contracting to the expanding path. The transition probabilities are
unaffected, because they do not depend on wages. As a result, societies with larger
w are more likely to find themselves in the expanding path; if they are not, then
collaboration happens less often than it would otherwise.
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A.1.3 The crown’s strength and income
An increase in the crown’s strength (ψ) causes the minimum value of ψe for which
there is collaboration to increase for all elite sizes, but it does not shift n̂. Therefore
collaboration happens less often, but the society does not shift between the con-
tracting and expanding paths. Similarly, an increase in crown income (y) reduces
the threshold for collaboration for all elite sizes (with the exception of the limiting
cases of nt−1 → 0 and nt−1 →∞), but does not shift n̂. Therefore it results in col-
laboration happening more often, but does not induce shifts between the contracting
and expanding paths.48
A.2 Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. If the king offered wages and does not renege, his payoff is
y +
nt−1 − λ(nt−1 − 1)
nt−1
R− znt−1w,
which equals crown income plus the rents he receives, minus the total wages he must
pay. If he tries to renege, his payoff is
ψ
(
y +
nt−1 − λ(nt−1 − 1)
nt−1
R
)
+ (1− ψ)
(
nt−1 − λ(nt−1 − 1)
nt−1
R− znt−1w
)
,
since with probability ψ he succeeds and avoids paying the wages, but with prob-
ability 1 − ψ he is defeated and loses the crown income while still having to pay
the wages. The king tries to renege if the latter is greater than the former. This
condition is equivalent to nt−1 >
(1−ψ)y
ψzw
.
48. It is also possible to do the comparative statics with respect to z, but this is a parameter for
which it is difficult to find an empirical counterpart in the historical literature.
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If the king granted elite rights and does not try to renege, his payoff is
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R
and if he tries to renege his payoff is
ψ
[
y + (1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)R
]
+ (1− ψ)
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R,
which is equal to the probability of winning ψ times the payoff (crown income plus
undiluted rents), plus the probability of losing (1 − ψ) times the diluted rents.
The king tries to renege if the latter is greater than the former. This condition is
equivalent to nt−1 < z1+z
ψλR
(1−ψ)y .
Lemma 2
Proof. If the king does not attack the barons, he receives
y +
nt−1 − λ(nt−1 − 1)
nt−1
R− znt−1w,
which is always less than what he receives when he attacks them, succeeds with
certainty, and expropriates all their rents for that period:
y +R.
Lemma 3
Proof. (i) Suppose that the king is rewarding a collaborator with both a wage and
elite rights. Then this must be sub-optimal; from assumption 1 it follows that the
king could ensure collaboration without paying a wage, as long as elite rights are
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granted. This would be enough to satisfy the collaborator’s reservation wage, saving
the king the amount paid as wage.
(ii) This result follows from the fact that the cost of extending the elite goes
down as the elite expands, while the wage a collaborator receives does not vary with
the number of collaborators. Suppose that pie collaborators are given rights, while
(1 − pi)e are paid in wages. For this to be an equilibrium then it must be that (i)
it is not worthwhile to change one collaborator’s compensation from wages to elite
rights, which is equivalent to the condition:
y+
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1 + pie
)
R−(1−pi)ew > y+
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1 + pie+ 1
)
R−(1−pi)(e−1)w
where the left-hand side is the payoff from not deviating, while the right-hand side
is the payoff from deviating by paying one fewer wage and instead offering that
collaborator rights. This is equivalent to
w <
[
1
nt−1 + pie
− 1
nt−1 + pie+ 1
]
λR
1− pi ≡ w
h.
It must also be true that (ii) it is not worthwhile to change one collaborator’s
compensation from elite rights to wages, which is equivalent to the condition
y+
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1 + pie
)
R−(1−pi)ew > y+
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1 + pie− 1
)
R−(1−pi)(e+1)w
where the left-hand side is the payoff from not deviating, while the right-hand side is
the payoff from deviating by extending rights to one fewer collaborator and instead
paying her a wage. This is equivalent to
w >
[
1
nt−1 + pie− 1 −
1
nt−1 + pie
]
λR
1− pi ≡ w
l
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Some additional algebra shows that wl > wh, and so this cannot be an equilibrium.
The equilibrium must consequently be at a ‘corner’, where all collaborators are
compensated with wages or where all are compensated with elite rights. In this case
there is only one deviation condition and the contradiction shown here does not
arise.
Lemma 4
Proof. If a peasant is approached with an offer of collaboration, she needs to decide
whether to accept it. If offered a wage w and nt−1 ≤ 1−ψψ yzw , then the king will not
try to renege (from lemma 1). In this case the peasant accepts as long as w ≥ w,
and so the king offers w = w, since this amount is enough to get the peasant to
collaborate and paying her more would result in the king receiving a lower payoff
without affecting the peasant’s collaboration decision.
If instead nt−1 >
1−ψ
ψ
y
zw
, the king will renege and so the peasant will no longer
accept an offer of w. The king must now offer w = w
1−ψ , which is the lowest offer
the peasant will accept. And since at the given value of nt−1 an offer of w led the
king to renege, it follows from lemma 1 that an offer of w
1−ψ will lead him to renege
too; this is consistent with the premium being applied to the wage.
Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose that the barons have revolted, and that the king decides to collab-
orate. He has four options: (i) offer a wage and not renege, (ii) offer a wage and try
to renege, (iii) offer elite rights and not renege, and (iv) offer elite rights and try to
renege.
(i) The king can only offer a wage of w and not renege if nt−1 ≤ 1−ψψ yzw . In this
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case he collaborates only if
ψe
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R− znt−1w
]
+ (1− ψe)
[(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R− znt−1w
]
> ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
[(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
where the first term is the probability of success when collaborating times the payoff
(taking into account that the wage must be paid), the second term is the probability
of defeat when collaborating times the payoff in that case (the king loses the crown
income and pays the wage bill), the third term is the probability of success when not
collaborating times the payoff, and the fourth term is the probability of defeat when
not collaborating times the payoff in that case (the king loses the crown income).
Simplying the expression yields
ψe > ψ +
znt−1w
y
.
Notice that if we solve this expression for nt−1 we get
nt−1 <
(ψe − ψ)y
zw
≤ 1− ψ
ψ
y
zw
,
and so this is consistent with the king not reneging.
(ii) If the king compensates with a wage and then tries to renege (if he defeats the
barons), he will have to offer a wage of w = w
1−ψ and it must be that nt−1 >
1−ψ
ψ
y
zw
.
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The king will collaborate if
ψe
[
ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
[(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R− nt−1zw
1− ψ
]]
+(1− ψe)
[(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R− nt−1zw
1− ψ
]
> ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
where the first term is the probability of success when collaborating multiplied by
the expected payoff from trying to renege (the king loses the crown income and pays
the wage bill if his attempt to renege fails), the second term is the probability of
defeat while collaborating times the payoff (the king loses the crown income and pays
the wage), the third term is the probability of success when not collaborating times
the payoff, and the fourth term is the probability of defeat when not collaborating
times the payoff in that case (the king loses the crown income). This condition is
never satisfied.
(iii) If the king compensates in rights and does not renege, then it must be that
nt−1 ≥ z1+z ψλR(1−ψ)y . The king will choose to collaborate if
ψe
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψe)
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R
> ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
which simplifies to
ψe > ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
.
Notice that if we solve this expression for nt−1 we get
nt−1 >
z
1 + z
1
ψe − ψ
λR
y
≥ z
1 + z
ψλR
(1− ψ)y ,
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and so this is consistent with the king not reneging.
(iv) If the king compensates in rights and then tries to renege (if he defeats the
barons), then it must be that nt−1 < z1+z
ψλR
(1−ψ)y . The king will collaborate if
ψe
[
ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R
]
+(1− ψe)
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R >
ψ
[
y +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
+ (1− ψ)
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
which is never satisfied.
Proposition 1
Proof. The previous lemma establishes the king’s optimal actions conditional on
the type of compensation offered to collaborators. In order to establish whether he
collaborates and how he compensates the collaborators, I now need to check whether
collaboration is optimal, and if so, which form of compensation is cheaper.
Suppose that there is a baronial rebellion. (i) If the king does not collaborate he
defeats the rebellion with probability ψ. He will choose not to collaborate when it
is not worthwhile to pay wages in order to ensure collaboration, which from lemma
5 is when:
ψe ≤ ψ + znt−1w
y
,
and when it is not worthwhile to grant elite rights to ensure collaboration, which
from lemma 5 is when:
ψe ≤ ψ + z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
.
Both conditions are satisfied when:
ψe ≤ min
{
ψ +
znt−1w
y
, ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
}
.
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(ii) If the king collaborates and pays a wage of w he wins with probability ψe
and does not renege (from lemma 5). Furthermore, we know that if wages are being
paid, collaboration happens if
ψe > ψ +
znt−1w
y
.
For wages to be paid instead of elite rights, it must be that they are a cheaper form
of compensation, which requires that
ψ +
nt−1zw
y
< ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
which simplifies to
nt−1 <
√
λR
(1 + z)w
.
Assumption 2 ensures that ψ + znt−1w
y
< 1 whenever nt−1 < n̂.
(iii) If the king collaborates and pays by extending elite rights he wins with
probability ψe and does not renege (from lemma 5). Furthermore, we know that for
elite rights to be extended it must be that
ψe > ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
.
For elite rights to be granted it must be that they are cheaper or cost just as much
as wages, which requires that
ψ +
z
1 + z
λR
nt−1y
≤ ψ + nt−1zw
y
which simplifies to
nt−1 ≥
√
λR
(1 + z)w
11
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Assumption 2 ensures that ψ + z
1+z
λR
nt−1y
< 1 whenever nt−1 ≥ n̂.
Proposition 2
Proof. (i) If the barons do not attack the king, the king attacks them, takes their
rents, and a randomly-chosen fraction z
1+z
of them are removed from the elite (lemma
2). Consequently, they all receive a payoff of 0. If there is a baronial revolt, each
baron’s payoff depends on the actions taken by the king:
If the king chooses (NC), each baron receives:
ψ
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R + (1− ψ)
[
y
nt−1 − 1 +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
since with probability ψ the king defeats the barons and they just earn rents, while
with probability 1− ψ the barons win, receive rents, and one of them becomes the
new king. Therefore a baron will receive crown income y with probability 1
nt−1−1 . If
the king chooses (CW), each baron receives:
ψe
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R + (1− ψe)
[
y − nt−1zw
nt−1 − 1 +
(
1− λ+ λ
nt−1
)
R
]
since with collaboration the king defeats the barons with probability ψe and the
barons just earn rents, while with probability 1− ψe the barons win, receive rents,
and one of them becomes the new king. Therefore a baron receives the crown income
(y minus the wages paid by the king) with probability 1
nt−1−1 . If the king chooses
(CE), each baron receives:
ψe
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R + (1− ψe)
[
y
nt−1 − 1 +
(
1− λ+ λ
(1 + z)nt−1
)
R
]
where with probability ψe the king wins and the barons receive diluted rents (since
the elite has expanded to include the king’s collaborators), while with probability
12
A.2 Proofs Supporting Information (Not for Publication)
1− ψe the barons win and receive the diluted rents, but now one of them becomes
the new king. Therefore a baron will receive crown income y with probability 1
nt−1−1 .
All of these payoffs are greater than 0, and so the barons always attempt a revolt
(a = 1).
(ii) With probability σ the barons solve their collective action problem, in which
case proposition 1 describes the rest of the equilibrium.
(ii) With probability 1−σ the barons fail to solve their collective action problem,
and so cannot revolt. In that case the king attacks the barons, succeeds with prob-
ability 1, and takes all rents and z
1+z
nt−1 barons are chosen at random and removed
from the elite (lemma 2).
Proposition 3
Proof. Recall that p (ei) = 1 − z1+z λR(1−ψ)eiy and ei+1 = (1 + z)ei > ei, and so it
follows that p (ei+1) > p (ei). The assumption on the transition probabilities for the
last state ensures the last part of the proposition holds.
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